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Introduction
We are accustomed to see political censorship as the main enemy of freedom of information.
However, if we intend information in a broad meaning, as code, we realize that even private
intellectual property might be regarded as a restraint to a free circulation of information. The
advocates of intellectual private property are facing a challenge against the legal devices they
recommend to protect it: patents, copyright restrictions, harsh and intrusive anti-piracy laws. On
the other hand, the critics of intellectual private property propose to conceive information as a
commons: code can be developed to everyone's advantage only in a community free to share
and to discuss it. The freedom of such a community, however, is connected to the freedom of its
object, that is to say to the publicness and openness of the code. It requires, in other words, a
kind of communism of knowledge.
The idea of code as a commons is usually asserted in relation with two specific, technical fields:
software and genetic code. The question of intellectual property may appear very specialized,
indeed. However, as it concerns the wider subject of freedom of information, it may be useful to
see it from the perspective of Western philosophy tradition. In it, communism of knowledge is a
marginal opinion, or is it intertwined in the mainstream?
The sociologist Pekka Himanen, in his recent book on hacker 1 ethic 2 , quotes a well-known
Theaetetus  passage  on  the  independence  of  theoretical  life 3 to  show  the  likeness  between
hackers' world and Plato's Academy. Such a comparison is not surprising: they both share a
peculiar freedom in defining their schedule and organizing their timetable. In the Academy and in
the scientific communities based on its model, scientists release their work to the public, so that
scientific community can use, test, criticize and improve it. The freedom of the scientific work
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and of  its  products  is  reflected in  the  freedom of  the  scientists.  Hackers  rely  on a  kind of
organized skepticism and of collective development of ideas that may be viewed as a prosecution
of Plato's Academy synousìa: they learn by staying together and by teaching others, that is by
taking part in a community of knowledge.
The connection between communism of knowledge and mainstream Western philosophy did not
appear as obvious, as long as the books used to be the major medium to preserve and transmit
information. In fact, as such a medium is a discrete physical object, the information it conveys
can be easily seen as a commodity, like the book itself, which is produced and distributed in a
specialized way. However, as Pierre Lévy says, the ongoing media  revolution undermines the
power  of  traditional  distributors,  because  it  makes  possible  a  direct,  personal  access  to
information.  Such a revolution concerns not only books and newspapers publishing,  cinema,
television and so on, but the very educational system as well. The teacher's principal role is no
longer one of transmitting knowledge, because this task is now more efficiently performed by
other means. His competence has to shift towards the incitement to learning and thinking – to
animate collective intelligence. 4 If information is no longer scarce, but overabundant, the typical
questions of theoretical life – how to produce, select, transmit and apply knowledge - are no
longer reserved to hackers, researcher or philosophers, because they concern a wider public.
Already in 1964, Marshall McLuhan understood it clearly:
Paradoxically, automation makes liberal education mandatory....a fate that calls man to the role of
artist in society. It has the effect of making most people realize how much they had come to depend
on the fragmentalized and repetitive routines of the mechanical era. Thousands of years ago, man
the nomadic food- gatherer, had taken up positional, or relatively sedentary, tasks. He began to
specialize. The developing of writing and printing were major stages of that process. They were
supremely  specialist  in  separating  the  roles  of  knowledge  from  the  roles  of  action...But  with
electricity and automation, the technology of fragmented processes suddenly fused with the human
dialogue  and  the  need  for  over-all  consideration  of  human  unity.  Men  are  suddenly  nomadic
gatherers of knowledge, nomadic as never before, informed as never before, free from fragmentary
specialization as never before--but also involved in the total social process as never before, since
with electricity we extend our central nervous system globally, instantly relating to every human
experience. 5
The  truth  of  McLuhan's  prophecy  depends  closely  on  intellectual  property  regulation.  If
information, like physical objects, has private proprietors, its accessibility will be submitted to
private economy laws and theoretical  life will  be subjugated, objectively and subjectively, to
economy. If  knowledge, as commons, cannot have private owners,  everyone will  be able to
collect  it  and  theoretical  life  will  remain  virtually  open.  Authors  like  Vandana  Shiva 6 and
Lawrence  Lessig  have  recently  advocated  the  freedom of  genetic  code  and  of  software.  In
Lessig's opinion, knowledge should remain a non-rivalrous commons, because it is like a public
road, whose values is not decreased, but increased by its general accessibility. 7 “He who receives
an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper
at  mine,  receives  light  without  darkening me.  That  ideas  should  freely  spread from one to
another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made
them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like
the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation”. 8
It is possible to outline arguments for the idea of knowledge as a commons both in Kant's and in
Plato's thought. We shall analyze those arguments, to show the continuity of a tradition that is
much more respectable and ancient than the claims of intellectual private property.
Kant's arguments
Kant wrote about copyright in a 1785 assay, Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks,
whose ideas were briefly restated in Metaphysik der Sitten, § 31, section II (1797). Therefore, if
Kant did non change his mind since 1785, we may read the 1785 essay together with another
1797  writing,  Über  ein  vermeintes  Recht  aus  Meschenliebe  zu  lügen,  which  deals  with  the
question of the proprietary nature of knowledge and of its relation with politics, while replying to
the liberal theorist Benjamin Constant.
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From Constant's point of view, we should not follow the moral imperative that prescribes us to
tell the truth in an unconditioned and abstract way, because society would become impossible. If
telling the truth is a duty, a right should be correlated to it; but no one has a right to any truth
that harms others. 9 This way of thinking presupposes that knowledge can be treated as an object
of a patrimonial right. Its owner can grant or deny accessibility to it and civil society exerts a
political control to limit the exercise of such a right, to prevent harm to others. In other words:
the accessibility of knowledge may be limited either by the will of its owner or by the public law,
which  has  to  restrain  the  right  of  the  owner  to  prevent  injuring  other  people.  Accordingly,
perceived dangers like French Revolution Terror, terrorism or, more simply, the perspective of an
economic damage for a group with a strong lobbying presence can become proper reasons to
justify a restraint to knowledge accessibility, even by means of censorship and disinformation.
Kant does not agree with Constant. First of all, he draws a distinction between two facets of
truth:  from  an  objective  point  of  view,  truth  is  a  proposition  being  true  or  false.  From a
subjective point of view, on the other hand, truth is a person's truthfulness or sincerity. 10
If truth in its first meaning were a proprietary thing, the being true or false of a proposition
would depend on the will of the owner. 11 But this cannot be the case: even a libertarian legal
system, which is is based on an absolute conception of private property, needs that the domain
of knowledge and justification of law be immune from individuals' property and arbitrary will.
Truth in its subjective meaning, as truthfulness, does not concern the objects of knowledge, but
the individual behaviors that grant or deny their accessibility to others. Lie – like political or
economic censorship – works as follows: even if I do accept that objective truth cannot depend
on my arbitrary will, I assign myself the right to decide who can access to it. And it is worth
noticing that, in Kant's thought, knowledge subjective accessibility and its objective truth are two
separate but intertwined facets: the freedom in the public use of reason is important, because
knowledge,  as  such,  does  not  work  as  a  private  experience,  but  as  conversation  and
intersubjectivity. 12
In Kant's opinion, no one has ever the right to lie, that is to restrain subjectively the accessibility
to  knowledge.  He  justifies  his  thesis  by  means  of  two  kinds  of  reasons,  concerning  the
connection of knowledge and law and the relation between knowledge and world:
lying would make public law useless. 13 In Kant's view, public law is founded on a ideal
contract of everyone with everyone, whose condition is publicness, as everyone's equal
accessibility to what is true and false. The liar violates this condition, because his arbitrary
will makes knowledge unequally accessible and undermines the very possibility of a public
and common law:
...because truth is not a possession (Besitzum), of which we grant a right to one and deny it
to another; but specially because the duty of truthfulness – we are speaking only about this -
does not make distinctions between persons to whom is it possible to maintain such a duty
and persons to whom it is possible to neglect it, but, on the contrary, it is an unconditioned
duty that is valid in every situation. 14
when we lie for good's sake, we suppose to know every possible consequence of our lie.
Only on the basis of this supposition we can be sure that all what follows from our lie will
be good as well. 15 We are, however, finite beings, who increase their knowledge in time: a
single individual could be sure that the consequences of his lie will  be in line with his
expected aim only if he had – while being a finite and separate individual - the whole world
under his cognitive control. Without such a control, his lie might turn out to be harmful, as
well as unfair.
Therefore,  a  proprietary  conception  applied  to  knowledge  has  two  major  flaws.  First,  it  is
impossible to establish a legal system valid for everyone while granting access to information in
a discriminating way. Second, it is impossible that finite individuals detain a total control of world
and knowledge.
We have articulated Kant's thesis in an intentionally abstract way. However, Kant and Constant
do discuss a very concrete question: in Kant's opinion, if a killer were hunting for a friend of ours
and the latter were hiding in our home, we should tell the truth even to the slayer, if he asks us
where  is  our  friend  and  we  cannot  avoid  answering. 16 We  cannot  assume  as  an  universal
principle the permission to restrain the knowledge access whenever we believe that it injures
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someone, because we would legitimize every kind of censorship and disinformation. In Kant's
time, the core question was the tenability of the French Revolution ideals after the Reign of
Terror; today, our core question is the freedom of information against the claims in favor of
political,  administrative  and economic  control.  The example  of  the  friend hunted by a  killer
belongs  to  the  private  sphere,  and  choosing  to  lie  may  appear  an  obvious  line  of  action.
However, if we assumed its principle as universal, it would undermine the very possibility of a
common public sphere. We may lie, if we want, to save our friends, but we have to acknowledge
that such an action is particular and arbitrary and cannot be adopted in a universal law, without
clashing with the publicness that is connected to the very concept of a public law.
If that is true, the restriction to information accessibility has to be evaluated mainly from a
political point of view. Kant himself says that the obligation to tell the truth can be applied only
with the mediation of the political principle of democratic autonomy: 17 we can be obliged only by
the laws to the constitution of which we took part.
A democracy founded on the principle of citizens' political autonomy can be genuine only if their
consensus is informed and aware. If information accessibility is restricted, for whatever reason,
citizens would not share the political power, but would be manipulated, because they would not
have  any  longer  the  opportunity  to  produce  a  well-informed  consensus.  A  democracy  that
abridges the freedom of information or consents to its limitation for economic reasons, is not a
genuine democracy.  Media  concentrations,  administrative  restrictions  to  free  speech and the
economic censorship connected to patents and copyright extension are not forgettable social and
bureaucratic incidents, but obstacles to democracy. This is the substance of the so-called Kantian
formalism.
Kant's 1785 essay, Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, sketches more clearly the
thesis that knowledge is incomparable to physical  objects and not proprietary. Kant draws a
distinction between the book as a physical object and the thoughts it conveys. The book as a
physical object becomes a property of whoever buys it. For this reason, it is not fair to restrain
the ways in which its legitimate purchaser may use it, without his consent. Therefore, if  we
intend a book as a physical object, we must admit that its buyer may copy it. On the other hand,
the thoughts that are published in a books remain a property of their author, regardless of their
reproduction, because they are not physical resources: I can continue to conceive my ideas even
if they are indefinitely reproduced. 18 The question of property makes sense only in the case of
physical objects, because they cannot be owned and used by everyone at the same time. On the
contrary, ideas can be reproduced and thought by everyone, without depriving their authors.
Even the question of the actual paternity of an idea does not properly concern property, but
historical truth. Properly speaking, the plagiarist that uses another person's ideas as they were
his own, is not a thief, but a liar. Again, "he who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
himself  without  lessening  mine;  as  he  who  lights  his  taper  at  mine,  receives  light  without
darkening me."
Knowledge is not a physical object exposed to a rivalrous use; for this reason it is senseless to
submit it to private property and to forbid the reproduction of ideas. On the other hand, from
Kant's point of view, it is equally senseless to forbid the reproduction of any physical object, if it
has  been  purchased  in  a  legal  transaction  and  the  purchaser  copies  it  by  his  own means.
Therefore, if we conceive intellectual property as a right on physical objects (jus reale or real
right), any reservation of copyright in untenable.
Kant tries to experiment the perspective of personal rights: a book is not only a physical object,
but it is also the medium through which an author can transmit his speech to the public. This
medium is provided by a publisher. For this reason, we can say that the publisher speaks in the
name of another. But someone may speak in the name of another person only if he has the
latter's authorization. And the authorized publisher ought to be only one, Kant asserts, because a
further reproduction would be useless and would spoil the business of both. 19 The mandate of
the author to the publisher is only a personal relationship that does not imply the acquisition of
proprietary rights on the text. Furthermore, the goal of this personal relationship is conveying a
speech to the public in its indefinite wideness. The author speaks to a public, and the public has
a right to his speech regardless to the publisher, whose rights are justified only as long as he
provides a medium to reach the public. Consequently, the editor may neither refuse to publish -
or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it himself - a text of a dead
author, nor release mutilated or spurious works, nor print only a limited impression that does not
meet the demand. 20
Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke or opera,  i.e.
things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or operae, i.e. actions. If the
works  of  art  are  simply  physical  objects,  we can derive  from Kant's  assumption that  every
legitimate purchaser may reproduce them and pass his copies to others. 21
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Kant backs the restriction of the freedom to reproduce a text only in connection with the author
as a living person and with his action towards the public. When the author disappears, the public
interest for a free circulation of information prevails. And every time a creative work is treated as
a proprietary thing, Kant does not see legal hindrances to the freedom of its legitimate owner to
reproduce  it.  He  would  endorse  as  legitimate  even  the  so-called  piracy,  that  is  to  say  the
reproduction of music, songs, images and films to gift or to sell them to others. Furthermore,
Kant would justify even texts reproduction for a personal use: the problem with unauthorized
printing is only the circumstance that the printer speaks to the public without s mandate from
the author. But if I reproduce a text only to read or to study it by myself, I do not speak to a
public in the name of its author.
Kant's position does not rely on pure reason only, but involves a perhaps intentional empirical
contamination. In the essay of 1785, the ground for the the exclusive nature of the mandate to a
publisher  is  only  the  interest  of  the  latter  to  avoid  competition. 22 In  the  later,  and  more
theoretical, Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant does not mention the question at all. In Kant's world the
press used to be medium that provided for the widest distribution of ideas. Printing requires both
specific  tools  and  skills,  and  specialized  and  centralized  organizations.  And  as  long  as  the
publisher of printed texts provides the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, we
cannot avoid to bow to his interest. But the primacy of the publisher's interest is not based on
reason,  but  only  on technology.  If  there  is  a  medium  that  makes  it  possible  to  authors  to
communicate directly with the public, without relying on publishers, respecting their interests
would become senseless. Such a medium, today, is the Internet.
When Kant draws a distinction between the work of art and the book and recognizes only to the
latter the quality of a speech, he repeats an ancient, Platonic distinction. The work of art can be
treated as a thing and copied because it is not a logos, and cannot talk with the public in a
dialogue. For this reason, we can separate if from its author's personality. However - as Kant
himself says - even a printed book is a separate and closed physical object. It contains certainly
a speech - a tentative dialogue with the public, in Kant's views -; but the speech is restricted by
the limitations of the medium it has to use to spread. For this reason, it is easy to confuse books
and speeches and to treat both as proprietary physical objects. A different medium,  like the
Internet, could help us to avoid such a confusion and to set eventually information free from a
proprietary conception of copyright.
Anàmnesis as emancipation
Immanuel  Kant  is  often  considered  as  a  modern  Platonist.  In  fact,  he  shares  with  Plato  a
non-proprietary conception of knowledge. It is not possible to present here a comprehensive
perspective on Plato. 23 However, we can analyze a single example: the well-known argument of
recollection, from the dialogue Meno:
Socrates;  Without  anyone  having  taught  him,  and  only  through  questions  put  to  him,  he  will
understand, recovering the knowledge out of himself?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And is not this recovery of knowledge, in himself and by himself, recollection?
Meno: Certainly.
Socrates: And must he not have either once acquired or always had the knowledge he now has?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: Now if he always had it, he was always in a state of knowing; and if he acquired it all
some time, he could not have acquired it in this life. Or has someone taught him geometry? You
see, he can do the same as this with all geometry and every branch of knowledge. Now, can anyone
have taught him all this? You ought surely to know, especially as he was born and bred in your
house.
Meno: Well, I know that no one has ever taught him.
Socrates: And has he these opinions, or has he not?
Meno: He must have them, Socrates, evidently.
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Socrates: And if he did not acquire them in this present life, is it not obvious at once that he had
them and learnt them during some other time?
Meno: Apparently.
Socrates: And this must have been the time when he was not a human being?
Meno: Yes. (Meno, 85d-86a, transl. W.R. Lamb)
Meno, a young Thessalian aristocrat who studied with the Sophist  Gorgias,  has been put in
difficulty by Socrates. At the beginning of the dialogue, Meno had proposed him a question that
was widely discussed in Athens philosophical circles: how is virtue (areté) acquired, or more
specifically, can virtue be taught? Socrates tried to explain him that, before answering such a
question, we have to solve a preliminary problem: how do we define aretè? Meno does not
succeed in solving the problem, either because he presents a list of areté  instances  without
caring about which common property makes them instances of the same term, or because he is
inclined to take for granted the term he has to define and produces circular reasonings. 24 At first,
Meno believed to master his logos; after speaking with Socrates, he feels himself benumbed just
like he had touched a torpedo sea-fish. Socrates says him: “For it is not from my being sure
(éuporos) that I cause others to doubt (aporéin): it is from being in more doubt (aporòn) than
anyone else that I cause doubt (aporéin) in others” (Meno, 80c-d)
The Greek verb aporéin, beyond its philosophical meaning – to be in doubt or puzzled -, has also
an economic meaning: to be without resource or to be poor. A little before, Socrates had refuted
a tentative definition of areté in which terms like poros, aporia, porìzesthai (to procure) occurred,
because it took the definiendum for granted: areté, Meno said at first, is the ability to procure
goods.  However,  he  had  admitted  later  that  an  unjust  acquisition  is  not  areté:  therefore,
Socrates concluded, poros  is no more a virtue than aporia  (deprivation). (Meno,  76c-e)  The
question is to explain what we mean with justice, if justice is a part of areté.
Refutation, thus, is an experience of deprivation, at least from the perspective of a proprietary
conception of  knowledge: we believed to have a tenable notion and,  after  an élenchos,  we
remain without anything. Meno tries to escape from his perplexities by asking a question that
comes from his sophistic education:
Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray,
what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your
search? Or even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you
did not know? (Meno, 80d)
Such a paradox cannot be overcome, if  we endorse a proprietary conception of  knowledge:
notions are entities that are distinct, separate and independent from each other. We can own or
not own them. If we do not own them, it is impossible for us to look for them, because our mind
is empty, as it were, and clueless.
Socrates  summons one of  Meno's  slave boys  and leads him,  by questioning,  from a wrong
answer to the right solution of a geometry problem. Among Meno characters, the slave boy is the
only  one  who  has  learned  something.  Socrates,  however,  taught  him nothing,  if  we  intend
teaching in a sophistic, proprietary meaning, because he did not give him any notion.
To show how it is possible to learn and to search, Socrates brings out an extraordinary tale: for
the human beings learning is recollection or anàmnesis, that is to say a recalling to their minds
already known notions, to become able to argue and to retain them in memory. Since we do
search and learn things we did not experienced during our individual lives, the knowing part of
ourselves, the soul or psyché, has to be immortal and independent from the human shape in
which it is wrapped at the moment.
Seeing then that the soul is immortal and has been born many times, and has beheld all things
both in this world and in the nether realms, she has acquired knowledge of all and everything; so
that it is no wonder that she should be able to recollect all that she knew before about virtue and
other things. For as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no reason why we
should  not,  by  remembering  but  one  single  thing--an  act  which  men  call  learning--discover
everything else, if we have courage and faint not in the search; since, it would seem, research and
learning are wholly recollection. (Meno), 81c-d
The  Marxist  thinker  Ernst  Bloch  deprecated  anàmnesis  as  a  methodical  expression  of
unfriendliness towards future. As ideas are viewed as residing in a timeless eternity, they cannot
evolve: thus they are reduced to an objectified and commodified factum. 25 We saw, however,
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that Meno's paradox – the impossibility to search for something we do not know – works only
with the presupposition of a proprietary conception of knowledge. But anàmnesis  implies the
opposite: research and learning can work – and avoid Meno's paradox – only if it is assumed a
previous continuum of a common, contextual and interconnected knowledge. I may vindicate no
idea as “mine”. Meno himself  can discuss on areté,  even if  he is not able to define it,  only
because he shares such a continuum. As I discover or learn something, it is certainly new for
me, in my finite and individual history, but I may not affirm that my notion is absolutely new and
“mine” in the sense that I created it ex nihilo. For I do not learn anything from nothing: I can
learn only if I share a previous common knowledge and I corroborate my ideas in a community
of discussion. Knowledge cannot be privatized without paradoxes, because its conditions cannot
be individualistic. 26
Therefore, knowledge cannot justify itself as the peculiar expression of an individual, or of social
class, of a group, a race or a culture, without reducing itself to a simple manifestation of taste.
Ideas have to be valid for everyone, and all those who are able to search and to learn must be
allowed to enter the realm of ideas, regardless of their social condition. Meno's slave boy has the
right to be citizen in the world of knowledge. And, as Socrates identifies virtue and knowledge,
the  doctrine  of  anàmnesis  implies  a  virtual  criticism  to  slavery  and  a  potentiality  for
emancipation.
In conclusion, the scrutiny of Kant and Plato's ideas on the social nature of knowledge suggests
two possible positions:
knowledge  produces  information  that  can  be  divided  into  discrete,  independent  and
separate units. Those units can be transmitted in a mechanical way and can be embedded
in proprietary physical objects. Therefore, whoever acquires them in a legal way enjoys the
same rights of the legitimate owner of physical objects and is free to reproduce them and
to give or to sell their copies to others;
a. 
knowledge is, in its very nature, societal, supra-individual and interpersonal; the possibility
of  producing and developing information depends on publicness.  Therefore  information
cannot become a private property without jeopardizing the very conditions of the common
world and of the knowledge sharing that is the ground even of private property as a public,
legal institution.
b. 
This essay tried to show that the latter position is sounder than the former. Anyway, even if the
former were preferred, the proprietary paradigm would not consistently be able to forbid the
reproduction and the distribution of informational entities. On the other hand, if we endorse the
latter position, we have to admit that the following passage of Richard Stallman is no unusual
eccentricity, but it is approved by the mainstream tradition of Western philosophy and science. It
is unusual and eccentric, instead, the proprietary conception that Stallman criticizes.
...copying useful, enlightening or entertaining information for a friend makes the world happier and
better off;  it  benefits the friend, and inherently hurts no one. It  is  a constructive activity that
strengthens social bonds.
Some readers may question this statement because they know publishers claim that illegal copying
causes them "loss." This claim is mostly inaccurate and partly misleading. More importantly, it is
begging the question.
The  claim  is  mostly  inaccurate  because  it  presupposes  that  the  friend  would
otherwise have bought a copy from the publisher. That is occasionally true, but
more often false; and when it is false, the claimed loss does not occur.
The claim is partly misleading because the word "loss" suggests events of a very
different nature--events in which something they have is taken away from them.
For example, if the bookstore's stock of books were burned, or if the money in the
register got torn up, that would really be a "loss." We generally agree it is wrong to
do these things to other people. But when your friend avoids the need to buy a copy
of a book, the bookstore and the publisher do not lose anything they had. A more
fitting description would be that the bookstore and publisher get less income than
they might have got. The same consequence can result if your friend decides to
play bridge instead of reading a book. In a free market system, no business is
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entitled to cry "foul" just because a potential customer chooses not to deal with
them.
The  claim is  begging  the  question  because  the  idea  of  "loss"  is  based  on  the
assumption  that  the  publisher  "should  have"  got  paid.  That  is  based  on  the
assumption that copyright exists and prohibits individual copying. But that is just
the issue at hand: what should copyright cover? If the public decides it can share
copies, then the publisher is not entitled to expect to be paid for each copy, and so
cannot claim there is a "loss" when it is not. In other words, the "loss" comes from
the copyright system; it is not an inherent part of copying. Copying in itself hurts no
one 27
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